The total value of the issue would be R14 million. 6 In exchange for 3 500 ordinary shares in Hamon J&C, Hamon SA would transfer assets to Hamon J&C, including the Hamon trade name and trademarks, as well as associated business connections. Hamon SA further agreed to purchase the 7 000 ordinary shares in Hamon J&C that would be issued to the second applicant. The result of the implementation of the sale and transfer agreement was that Hamon SA held 10 500 ordinary shares in Hamon J&C, while the balance of 7 000 ordinary shares was held by the first, third and fourth applicants. 7 The transactions concluded before the formation of Hamon J&C that gave rise to the dispute between the applicants and respondents are subsequently discussed.
On 29 July 2010 the holding company of Hamon SA, Hamon & Cie (International SA) (Hamon International; the third respondent) sold 26% of its shares in Hamon SA to transaction had the potential of destroying their business prospects and, accordingly, they were exposed to serious business risks for the future. 16 Another contention was that the improper BEE transaction was a material matter that was not disclosed to the applicants before the business of J&C was transferred to Hamon J&C, which non-disclosure disregarded their interests. 17 However, it is unclear how the improper BEE transaction could be disclosed to the applicants before the business of J&C was transferred to Hamon J&C, as the agreements for the sale of shares were terminated, and the shares taken back by Hamon International, only after the business of J&C had been transferred to Hamon J&C.
The applicants' attitude was that the improper BEE transaction was so serious in nature that they simply could not be associated with Hamon SA and Hamon
International.
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They argued that the improper BEE transaction, along with the fact that Hamon SA and Hamon International did not take the appropriate measures to remedy the conduct, was oppressive.
… an order directing an exchange of shares between the second applicant and Hamon SA as envisaged in sec 163(2)(e); and/or directing the restoration of Hamon SA by the applicant of a part, alternatively, the whole of the consideration that Hamon SA paid for the shares, with conditions as envisaged in sec 163(2)(g); and/or varying or setting aside the sale of shares transaction between Hamon SA, the second applicant and Hamon J&C and compensating Hamon J&C and/or the second applicant, or any other of the applicants as envisaged in sec 163(2)(h); and that Hamon SA pay compensation to the second applicant and/or Hamon J&C, as envisaged in section 163(2)(j) …
3

The judgment
The Court made three findings on the facts, relating to the requirements contained in section 163(1)(a), on which it based its judgment. It found that it was the intention of the parties "that J&C Engineering should benefit from the use of the "Hamon" name as well as its alleged goodwill" and, accordingly, that the improper BEE transaction caused the applicants to be prejudiced.
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It found the fact that the improper BEE transaction was not remedied by the respondents to be oppressive to the applicants, 23 as the credibility of a company such as Hamon J&C's BEE status was vital to ensure ongoing business. 24 Finally, the Court found the non-disclosure of the improper BEE transaction to be unfairly prejudicial to the applicants and to unfairly disregard their interests.
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Although the Court found that "[t]he applicants were … exposed to serious business risks especially if the DTI eventually [found] that the whole BEE issue was a sham" it did not indicate whether this exposure amounted to unfair prejudice, oppression, or a disregard of the applicants' interests.
26
In other words, the Court's finding that the applicants were exposed to serious business risks was not indicated to satisfy any specific result as required in section 163(1)(a).
Comments
Introduction
In casu the Court held that "[a] careful consideration of the interpretation given by our courts to the provisions of sec 252 of the old Companies Act and the provisions in sec 163 of the new Companies Act … shows a continuing intention by the legislature to broaden relief in these provisions, rather than to limit them".
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It based its finding on the fact that the Act provides for a new ground on which an applicant can rely, namely conduct that unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant; the In our opinion, it is important to draw a distinction between the application of section 163 and the orders that the Court can make to provide relief in terms of subsection (2). Section 163 applies where an applicant can prove that the specified statutory criteria provided for in subsection (1) have been satisfied, while subsection (2) contains an open-ended list of orders that the Court can make to provide relief for a successful applicant. Clearly, the application of section 163 of the Act is wider than the application of section 252 of the previous Act. Accordingly, we agree with the Court that locus standi is extended to the directors of the company and that relief can now be sought regarding the conduct of a person related to the company.
We also agree that subsection (2) contains a wide range of orders that the Court can make to provide relief for a successful applicant. In fact, the relief that can be provided in terms of section 163(2) seems to be wider than the relief that could have been provided in terms of section 252. For example, in terms of section 163(2)(f)(i) the Court can make "an order … appointing directors in place of or in addition to all or any of the directors then in office". This power was apparently excluded under section 252 of the previous Act. intention by the legislature to broaden relief in these provisions, rather than to limit them", 30 we deem it necessary to stress the fact that this does not mean that the oppression remedy is available to applicants in circumstances where the requirements of section 163 (1) are not satisfied. The oppression remedy is available only if an act or omission by a company or a person related to the company has had a result that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of a shareholder or a director of the company; or if the carrying on of the business of the company, or the exercising of the powers of a director or a prescribed officer of the company is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to a shareholder or a director of the company. Relief cannot be granted in terms of subsection (2) where the requirements of subsection (1) -the specified statutory criteria -have not been satisfied.
In Louw v Nel
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(Louw), regarding the application of section 252 of the previous Act, the Court held that "[a]n applicant … must establish the following: that the particular act or omission has been committed, or that the affairs of the company are being conducted in the manner alleged and that such act or omission or conduct of the company's affairs is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to him or some part of the members of the company; the nature of the relief that must be granted to bring to an end the matters complained of; and that it is just and equitable that such relief be granted" and that "the court's jurisdiction to make an order does not arise until the specified statutory criteria have been satisfied". be a shareholder or a director of the company, as envisaged in subsection (1), are the specified statutory criteria that must be satisfied.
In our opinion the Court erred in relying on the fact that locus standi is extended to the directors of a company and that relief can now be sought regarding the conduct of a person related to the company, as well as the fact that relief that can be provided in terms of section 163(2) seems to be wider than the relief that could have been provided in terms of section 252, to justify such a broad approach to the application of the oppression remedy, that even non-compliance with some of the specified statutory criteria did not preclude the applicants from being successful in their application in terms of section 163.
The statutory criteria specified in section 163, as well as the question of whether the criteria was satisfied in Peel, are subsequently discussed.
Brief analysis of section 163
A shareholder or a director of a company has to prove that an act or omission by his or her company, or a person related to his or her company, has had a result that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to him or her, or a result that unfairly disregards his or her interests (section 163(1)(a)). Alternatively, the shareholder or director has to prove that the carrying on of the business of his or her company (section 163(1)(b)), or the exercising of the powers of a director or a prescribed officer of his or her company (section 163(1)(c)), is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to him or her, or unfairly disregards his or her interests. It is interesting to note that, unlike an act or omission that must have had a result that unfairly disregards the applicant's interests, the carrying on of the business of the company, or the exercising of the powers of a director or a prescribed officer, need not have had such a result, but it must be conducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the applicant's interests.
Applicant
It is clear from the wording of section 163(1) that only a shareholder or a director of a company has locus standi to exercise the oppression remedy.
Some authors contend that the wording of section 163(1) implies that an applicant may exercise the oppression remedy if the conduct complained of occurred before he or she became a shareholder or a director of the company.
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While we agree that section 163(1) does not specifically provide that an applicant has to be a shareholder or a director of the company when the conduct occurs, we submit that it is not settled that this section should be interpreted to provide that the oppression remedy should be extended further than it has already been extended by section 163, in comparison with section 252 of the previous Act.
Although, prima facie, it may seem as though Peel is by implication authority for the contention that a shareholder or a director who wants to exercise the oppression remedy need not have been a shareholder or a director at the time of the conduct as, in casu, the applicants were never shareholders or directors of Hamon SA or
Hamon International, and they were neither shareholders, nor directors of Hamon Gotthard the Court agreed that in order to be able to exercise the oppression remedy "the act must be completed". 
Conduct
The conduct complained of in casu was that a person related to Hamon J&C, namely
Hamon International, conducted an improper BEE transaction, that this transaction was not disclosed to the applicants before the business of J&C was transferred to
Hamon J&C, and that the conduct was not remedied by the respondents.
As stated earlier, the applicants contended that the improper BEE transaction had the potential of destroying their business prospects and, accordingly, that they had been exposed to serious business risks for the future.
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Further, they contended that the improper BEE transaction was a material matter that was not disclosed to them before the business of J&C was transferred to Hamon J&C, which non-disclosure disregarded their interests.
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While the improper BEE transaction, together with the fact that it was not remedied, seems to constitute conduct for the purpose of section 163(1), the applicants' contention that the improper BEE transaction was not disclosed to them prior to the transfer of the business of J&C to Hamon J&C makes it seem as though they wanted to rely on a material misrepresentation as the basis for the contract (the sale and transfer agreement) to be rescinded. The fact that the Court granted the relief as prayed for in the notice of motion, by ordering the restitution of shares, the cancellation of all licensing and shareholder agreements, and the resignation of all the directors appointed by Hamon SA to the board of directors of the joint venture company, and that the name of the joint venture company be changed to J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd, further makes it seem as though the applicants wanted, and are of the opinion that the applicants should not have been successful in their application in terms of section 163.
Result
Section 252(1) of the previous Act did not refer to the term "result", as is the case in section 163(1)(a) of the Act. However, regarding section 252 of the previous Act, in Aleph   44 the Court held that an applicant had to prove that the conduct complained of, as well as the effect (the result) of the conduct, was unfairly prejudicial to him or her. Accordingly, the result-requirement of section 163 (1) is not an additional requirement. It should also be noted that neither para (b) nor para (c) specifically refers to the term "result". In our opinion, the purpose of the reference to the term "result" in section 163 (1)(a) Similarly, we do not agree with the Court in Peel that "a serious business risk" is a result that satisfies the requirements of section 163(1). Moreover, the Court held that "[t]he applicants were and are exposed to serious business risks especially if the DTI eventually [finds] that the whole BEE issue was a sham".
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It seems as though the Court did not find that the applicants were exposed to a serious business risk, but that they would be exposed to a serious business risk if the DTI eventually found that the BEE transaction was improper. As stated earlier, the Court also did not specifically indicate that this exposure constituted prejudice, oppression, or a disregard of the applicants' interests.
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The Court's finding implies that not only is a serious business risk a result that satisfies the requirements of section 163, but also that the same is true for the mere possibility of a serious business risk.
We submit that uncertainty whether a specific event may materialise or not cannot be regarded as a result which satisfies the requirements of section 163(1)(a). A risk is not an eventuality; it implies that something may or may not happen. Claiming that a risk is serious does not change the fact that something still may or may not happen. The possibility of a risk is removed even further from an eventuality. In casu, the Court effectively held that the applicants may or may not lose business in the future if the DTI found that the BEE transaction was improper, which it may or may not do. So, even if the DTI finds that the BEE transaction was improper, it is still possible for the applicants not to lose any business.
Detriment
If uncertainty is held to be enough to satisfy the result-requirement of section 163(1), by implication an applicant need not prove oppression, unfair prejudice, or any unfair disregard of his or her interests as required by section 163 (1) Hamon International, but because of the improper BEE transaction this expectation was destroyed and, accordingly, the applicants were prejudiced.
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It is clear from the wording of section 163(1) that an applicant has to prove that the result of the conduct complained of is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to him or her, or that the result of the conduct unfairly disregards his or her interests. Further, this detriment has to exist when an applicant applies to Court. In casu, the applicants failed to prove that there was any oppression, unfair prejudice, or any unfair disregard of their interests at the time of the application. Accordingly, in our opinion the application in terms of section 163, as well as the Court's finding that the applicants were prejudiced by the improper BEE transaction, and that the failure to remedy the conduct was oppressive toward them, were premature.
Another important issue that should be kept in mind is that an applicant must experience detriment in his or her capacity as a shareholder or director of the company. In Count Gotthard the Court held that conduct "must result in unfair prejudice to [the applicant] in his capacity as a shareholder". 
Conclusion
As stated earlier, in our opinion Peel should not be regarded as authority for the contention that a shareholder or a director who wants to exercise the oppression remedy need not have been a shareholder or a director of the company at the time of the conduct, as the conduct complained of in casu had not been completed by the time the joint venture company was incorporated and, accordingly, the applicants were shareholders of Hamon J&C when the conduct occurred. important it is for a company in a group to assess how the conduct of other companies in the group will impact on it.
We submit that two of the requirements of section 163(1) had not been satisfied in Peel, namely the result-requirement and the detriment-requirement.
As stated earlier, we are of the opinion that uncertainty that there will be a result is not a result and, accordingly, that the Court incorrectly found the applicants to have proven that the result-requirement of section 163(1) had been satisfied. It should be noted, however, that we do not question the fact that the oppression remedy can be utilised to ensure that an applicant is not exposed to "further risks", as was the situation in Grancy. 
